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Abstract
Little research has been done to examine discrimination against gays and lesbians in the labor
market. Wage regressions have documented lower incomes for gays but repeatedly showed higher
incomes for lesbians. The results concerning lesbian women are striking but can be reconciled with
the existence of labor market discrimination, however. Problems like sample selection and
unobserved heterogeneity—in particular, lesbians’ violation of stereotypical female gender roles—
might be responsible for their higher earnings.
To investigate whether discrimination against lesbians actually does exist, a labor market
experiment is conducted. Job applications of candidates, who are equivalent in their human capital
but differ in their sexual orientation, are sent out in response to job advertisements. Furthermore, to
test whether increased masculinity affects labor market outcomes, the applicants differ in their
perceived gender identity.
While results show a strong negative effect for lesbian orientation, gender identity does not have
a significant overall impact on hiring chances.
D 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: C93; J15; J71
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1. Introduction
A number of demographic groups are reported to be affected by labor market
discrimination: women, ethnic and national minorities, disabled workers, as well as
religious and sexual minorities have been observed to face unfavorable labor market
outcomes. Most studies on discrimination focus on earnings differentials by race or gender
since corresponding data is more readily available. Nevertheless, not only do these groups
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Labour Economics 10 (2003) 629–642represent merely a fraction of the possibly discriminated population, but discrimination
can also take on different forms, i.e. can also occur in hiring, promotion and firing.
This study investigates discrimination against lesbians in hiring. The demographic
group of lesbian workers is of particular interest, since—contrary to other social
minorities, including gay men—they have repeatedly been shown to earn higher wages
than their reference group, i.e. heterosexual women (see, e.g. Black et al., 2003;
Blandford, 2003; Plug and Berkhout, in press).
1 However, despite their apparently
privileged labor market status, 16–46% of gay and lesbian survey respondents report
to have experienced some form of labor market discrimination (see Badgett et al., 1992,
for a review of surveys). These seemingly contradictory findings can be reconciled,
however. A number of reasons suggest that lesbians’ earnings are overestimated, most
importantly because of unobserved heterogeneity and statistical reasons.
The adopted gender role of lesbians and heterosexual women is one example for such
unobserved differences in characteristics. Lesbians are documented as often behaving in
more manly ways and being more masculine, i.e. more dominant, autonomous, assertive
and detached than heterosexual women (see Riess et al., 1974). It has been argued that
since employers adhere to the ideal of masculinity which is associated with labor market
success, lesbians might be financially rewarded in contrast to heterosexual women (see
Blandford, 2003; Clain and Leppel, 2001).
However, lesbians might deviate from heterosexual women also in other dimensions. In
particular, lesbians have been shown not to adhere to the traditional division of labor
within the household where primarily one partner is responsible for household tasks.
2 This
is economically rational, since members of same-sex relations often have similar abilities
and labor market opportunities which do not allow them to make use of comparative
advantages. Furthermore, since most countries do not offer a legal substitute for marriage,
specializing in house work becomes a risky choice. Since lesbian couples rear children less
frequently, there is less need for a homemaker as well. As a result of reduced household
responsibilities, lesbians might be more productive in the workplace and obtain higher
wages than heterosexual women. The lack of children also makes higher investments in
on-the-job-training profitable since lesbians expect a more continuous labor market
participation than heterosexual women. Such higher on-the-job-training, unobservable in
the data, might be another reason for the observed higher pay.
In addition to unobserved heterogeneity, there are statistical reasons which bias
lesbians’ earnings upwards. Blandford (2003) reports that lesbian and bisexual women
are more successful in entering male-dominated, well-paid occupations than their
heterosexual peers and suggests that even controlling for occupations at the two-digit
level might be insufficient to capture all effects of occupational clustering. Consequently,
some of lesbians’ higher incomes might be attributable to job subcategories which are not
adequately captured by the data. Furthermore, it is most probable that the analyzed data
suffer from sample selection bias. Higher income individuals are more willing to disclose
their lesbian orientation. As a result, their observed earnings are upwardly biased. Last but
not least, the empirical data suffers from one additional major drawback: Available data
1 For an review of studies on wage differentials based on sexual orientation, see Badgett (2002).
2 For a review of the literature, see Giddings (in press).
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for direct labor market discrimination by employers. Many gays and lesbians choose not to
reveal their sexual orientation on the job to avoid mobbing and employment discrimina-
tion, and pass as heterosexuals. Badgett (1996) reports from survey data that significantly
fewer lesbians out themselves on the job than gay men. This might be another reason why,
on average, lesbians do not suffer from the same income loss as gay men.
Due to these specific flaws in the available data, empirical research examining wage
differentials, although highly interesting, cannot inform about labor market discrimination
against equally productive gays and lesbians. From a policy perspective, however—e.g.
when fighting direct discrimination or advising gays and lesbians whether to come out—
the existence and amount of direct employer discrimination is crucial.
This paper takes a different route to assess differential treatment by using an
experimental technique to gather representative data on labor market outcomes of lesbians.
Labor market experiments can best be used to investigate discrimination in hiring and have
the advantage that typical problems of earnings regressions can be avoided.
2. Experimental investigation
The crucial advantage of an experiment is the full control the researcher has over her
data. In particular, identical productivity as well as sexual orientation of workers can be
controlled for by the experimenter. Therefore, a carefully setup design allows to test for
what is of central interest: direct discrimination against openly lesbian employees with
equal productivity compared to the heterosexual control group, without having one’s data
flawed by sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity.
In this study we use a common experimental method called Correspondence Testing to
examine the hiring chances of lesbians. Re ´sume ´s of applicants who were matched in all
relevant productive characteristics, like age, schooling and job experience, but differed in
their indicated sexual preference, were sent out in response to job advertisements. All
candidates indicated being single in their CVs to avoid any differences in expected
productivity. If one applicant was invited to an interview by an employer, while the other
was not, this was assigned to discrimination. With this technique, the labor market
outcomes of two identical individuals of equal productivity, who only differ in respect to
their demographic group, can be compared directly.
3
As has been noted before, some economists (Blandford, 2003; Clain and Leppel,
2001) have suggested that lesbians’ increased masculinity, their similarity to the
stereotypical male, is responsible for their relatively high incomes. Masculinity (being
assertive, dominant, etc.)
4 might either constitute a productive personality trait in the
labor market, or employers simply have preferences for more masculine workers. Since
3 Certainly this experimental method does impose some costs on the employer, as re ´sume ´s of applicants who
are actually not available have to be evaluated, but these costs are not infrequent, as workers often want to test
their outside opportunities to increase their bargaining situation at the current job (Riach and Rich, 1995).
4 Bem (1974) specifies the following characteristics as commonly being perceived as ‘‘typically male’’: acts
as a leader, aggressive, ambitious, analytical, assertive, athletic, competitive, defends own beliefs, dominant,
forceful, has leadership abilities, independent, individualistic, makes decisions easily, masculine, self-reliant, self-
sufficient, strong personality, willing to take a stand, willing to take a risk.
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investigate whether those ‘‘masculine characteristics’’ can actually explain lesbians’
higher earnings. We found this question particularly interesting, since psychologists have
previously argued that one of the reasons why lesbians are disliked is their frequent
violation of gender stereotypes and display of ‘‘inappropriate’’ gender mannerisms
(‘‘butch’’ and ‘‘femme’’). Laner and Laner (1980) found that it is personal style as well
as sexual preference that triggers a dislike of gays and lesbians. They showed that when a
lesbian performs average heterosexual femininity, this in fact reduces dislike against her.
Consequently, masculinity might not only be beneficial but could as well trigger a taste
for discrimination.
Different treatment when equally productive?
A number of reasons why direct discrimination based on sexual orientation might occur
are conceivable. In comparison to race and sex discrimination, unfavorable treatment is
less likely to be motivated by employers’ beliefs in different group averages of
productivity, i.e. statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973). Gays and lesbians
are the only social minority that is actually brought up within a majority culture (by
heterosexual parents) and cannot be identified solely by their looks (skin color, sex).
5 In
contrast to females and ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians are socialized according to
‘‘majority norms’’, already from birth on. Consequently, they are most likely to match the
social majority group, i.e. heterosexuals, in their average productivity. If anything,
statistical discrimination should work in favor of the lesbian! Lesbians are not only better
equipped in observables, the fact that they earn more on average even when controlling for
observables reflects that they are also doing better in the unobservables. In particular, the
fact that they are less likely to drop out of the labor market due to child birth should make
them attractive employees. Therefore, we should expect preferential treatment due to
positive statistical discrimination. This would only reduce the amount of discrimination we
observe, and Beckerian discrimination, in fact, is underestimated.
When controlling for productive characteristics and gender identity—which might
differ for gay/lesbian and heterosexual individuals and cause differences in productivity—
most unfavorable treatment can be assigned to a distaste of working with gays and lesbians
because of a disapproval of their sexual orientation. Following Becker’s (1957) taste for
discrimination model, entrepreneurs might have a preference to work with heterosexual
employees, and if they maximize utility and not profits, they are prepared to hire them,
even if they are of lower productivity or have higher reservation wages. Similarly,
coworkers’ dislikes to working with gays and lesbians might lead to unfavorable
treatment. Various surveys indicate that such a dislike against gay and lesbian workers
in fact does exist. Black et al. (2003) report that in the General Social Survey data, ‘‘83%
of men and 80% of women responded that same-sex sexual relations are ‘always wrong’ or
‘usually wrong’.’’ Klawitter and Flatt (1998) give an overview of numerous opinion polls
and find that around 20% of Americans do not favor equal job opportunities for gays and
5 Other examples for characteristics, which are unobservable and employers might have preferences for, are
religion or national origin (Badgett, 1995).
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60% in the late 1970s to around 80% in the 1990s.
3. Method
Correspondence Testing has been widely used to measure race (e.g. Newman, 1978;
Firth, 1981; Riach and Rich, 1991) and sex discrimination (Firth, 1982; Riach and Rich,
1995). Adam (1981) used a similar technique for testing discrimination based on sexual
orientation. While very interesting in extending the research to a previously neglected area
of discrimination, his study has more the touch of a pilot study with its rather small sample
and lack of statistical information.
Correspondence Testing allows to compare the labor market outcomes of applicants
who are identical in all their productive characteristics but differ in one demographic
variable. The necessary data is gained by sending out matched letters of applications to the
same job openings. If a firm invites one applicant but not another, then this can be
attributed to discrimination.
6 Similar experiments have been used to examine the treatment
of same-sex and opposite-sex couples by salespersons’ in stores (Walters and Curran,
1996) and by hotels’ when requiring a weekend reservation for a room with one bed only
(Jones, 1996).
Usually conducted in America, Australia or Great Britain, previous studies using
Correspondence Testing suffer from the general drawback that only very short re ´sume ´s are
common in these countries, a fact which possibly does not allow controlling for all
relevant variables. Consequently, the possibility of mere statistical discrimination cannot
be ruled out (see Heckman, 1998).
7 The Austrian labor market, on the other hand, has the
advantage that this problem can be avoided without raising employers’ suspicion.
8 In
Austria, a very detailed set of documents is required to be considered a serious job
6 Obviously testing whether somebody gets invited for an interview captures differential treatment at the
initial stage of hiring only, while some employers might delay their ‘‘discriminatory activity’’ until later. Still, the
possibility of receiving a job offer is conditional on being invited to an interview, which means that differential
treatment in hiring has to be equal or larger to what is measured by Correspondence Testing (Riach and Rich,
1995). Researchers at the Urban Institute (e.g. Kenney and Wissoker, 1994) have extended this method to the next
stage of the hiring process. In their ‘‘Audit Studies’’, they have not only sent out written applications but also
matched pairs of real applicants of different ethnic groups who actually met employers for an interview. This
allows the observing of discrimination in actual job offers, although it suffers from the disadvantage that real-life
applicants who meet all the required criteria are hard to find. Furthermore, it is impossible to control for
differences in real-life interactions that might take place during an interview. ‘‘Audit Studies’’ have also been
conducted to measure discrimination in housing, applying for a mortgage, negotiating the price of a car and
seeking taxi services (see Fix et al., 1993 for an overview of auditing for discrimination).
7 When testing for discrimination based on sexual orientation this is generally a less severe problem, however,
since—as has been stated before—there seems to be little prejudice about gays’ and lesbians’ productivity. If there
are no presumed differences in productivity, no statistical discrimination can occur.
8 Austria has not yet adopted any anti-discrimination policies protecting gays and lesbians against unfair
treatment in the labor market, in contrast to 12 states and many cities in the US and most other countries in the
European Union that already have anti-discrimination laws. However, a directive by the European Union in
autumn 2000 imposes the implementation of such a national law upon Austria within a time frame of three years.
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reports, letters of reference by previous employers, and a photograph. This vast amount of
information largely dismisses the possibility of mere statistical discrimination. A similarly
convincing experiment could not be conducted in the US without a great risk of being
detected.
To test for discrimination based on sexual orientation and identify whether gender has a
mediating effect on differential treatment, a 22 experimental design has been used,
varying sexuality (heterosexual/lesbian identity) and gender (femininity/masculinity) of
the applicants. Consequently, application material had to be constructed for four different
types: a heterosexual (straight) feminine and straight masculine woman, a feminine lesbian
(‘‘femme’’), and a masculine lesbian (‘‘butch’’).
9
3.1. Gender types
To meet Austrian standards, the application material consisted of a letter of
application, an elaborate curriculum vitae, a fake school report and a photograph.
Obviously, the need to attach photographs of equally good-looking applicants made the
preparation of the application material considerably more demanding, but also served as
an advantage for the research question: physical looks are one of the strongest indicators
for gender identity and could be used as a signal accordingly. While the masculine
woman depicted in the photo had short, dark hair, broad shoulders and was wearing a
business jacket, the feminine one had long, blond hair and was in elegant, flowing
clothes.
Other indicators for gender identity were the following: choice of font and layout in the
CV and hobbies. The layout of the feminine applicant’s CV was nice and playful, the
design of the masculine appeared rather plain. The feminine female’s hobbies were
drawing, designing and making of clothes, while the masculine enjoyed rock-climbing,
canoeing, playing drums, and motorcycling.
10
A pre-test was conducted to verify the successful representation of the two females’
gender identity and to ensure that the differences of all job applicants in their self-
presentation (in particular the photographs) did not cause distortions in general
desirability. One hundred nineteen business students were asked to evaluate one
applicant each, represented by her CV and photo. There was no information on sexual
orientation given for the candidates. The Bem Sex-Role Inventory
11 used is a standard
measure for gender identity in psychology and provides a sufficient tool to test the
dimensions ‘‘femininity’’, ‘‘masculinity’’, and ‘‘social desirability’’. While the feminine
female achieved significantly higher scores in femininity and the masculine female in
10 In addition, different international job experiences (au pair girl for the feminine, motorcycle tour with
occasional jobs for the masculine female) were given for accountants, one of the two occupational subcategories
tested. Since they were of higher age than the secretaries (matched to the average employee in the occupation), it
was possible to indicate one-and-a-half years international experience for both applicants without evoking too
much suspicion. See Weichselbaumer (in press) for details.
9 Detailed application materials (standard letters of application, CVs, school reports and photographs) are
available from the author upon request.
11 See Bem (1974) for description.
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identical.
12
3.2. Sexual orientation types
For half of the applicants no explicit information on sexual orientation was given, these
were classified as heterosexuals. The lesbians were labeled by the following information
about their secondary occupation: ‘‘1996–1998: Managerial activity for the Viennese Gay
People’s Alliance.’’ To indicate that this personal engagement in the gay and lesbian
movement would not conflict with job dedication, the affiliation with the Gay People’s
Alliance already laid in the past.
13 In contrast to many other gay and lesbian organizations
around the world, the Austrian Gay People’s Alliance has no affinities to any political
party but represents gays and lesbians of all political and religious convictions. To signal a
similar amount of social awareness, this commitment to volunteer work by the lesbians
was juxtaposed by matching statements for the straight applicants, varied for different
gender identities. The feminine straight woman declared to volunteer for a nonprofit
organization assisting school children with learning disabilities and the masculine woman
for a nonprofit cultural center.
The different sexuality/gender types were simply created by combining the gendered
CVs with the sexual orientation information.
The application letters were constructed to match the average employee in the clerical
profession, i.e. accountant and secretary.
14 This occupational category was chosen because
the relatively high labor demand allowed sending out a sufficient number of standardized
applications in response to job advertisements to gather a representative sample. Further-
more, it allowed to create convincing application material (e.g. by providing school
13 Some employers might not discriminate against lesbians per se, but only against those who list
participation in gay and lesbian organizations on their CVs. They may perceive the lesbian applicant as a radical
or as lacking business savvy, since she does not try to hide her sexual orientation more actively. However,
previous professional engagement with a gay and lesbian organization clearly serves as an indicator for relevant
job experience, so hiding sexual orientation means either concealing relevant human capital or lying about one’s
past with the risk of being detected.
In previous experiments, authors indicated sexual orientation by affectionate behavior of the individuals
(holding hands, talking to one another smiling) (Walters and Curran, 1996) or by couples requesting a room with
one bed only in a hotel (Jones, 1996).
12 Only one previous study using Correspondence Testing, Newman (1978), reported the attachment of
photographs, and was severely criticized for not controlling for physical attractiveness of the applicants (see
McIntyre et al., 1980). Since a number of studies have shown that beauty has an impact on labor market decisions
(e.g. Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; 1998; Averett and Korenman, 1996), it seemed important to add physical
attractiveness as a separate item to the social desirability dimension provided by the Bem Sex-Role Inventory.
Similarly, the item ‘‘making a competent impression’’ was included to ensure that photographs and other
variations in the CVs did not cause one applicant to look relatively more proficient than the other. For details on
scores of applicants and statistical tests, see Weichselbaumer (in press).
14 Both of these jobs are female-dominated ones: 77% of all accountants and 97% of all secretaries are
women. The average income of women in both occupations is o1000 according to the Micro Census 1997; the
average overall female income is o900 (male: o1300). Weichselbaumer (in press) has tested the effect of sex
and gender conformity of heterosexual applicants not only for female- but also for male-dominated occupations
and found discrimination by sex but not by gender.
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to test the verbal fluency of applicants).
To avoid detection, names of employers were avoided in the CVs and job experience
was formulated in a rather general way. All accountants and secretaries had identical
human capital and obtained their education in exactly the same school-type, only at
different locations. The school marks in the attached school reports were identical for all
applicants in those subjects of primary relevance for the jobs under investigation and equal
on average in subjects of lower interest. The photograph was attached in the form of a
(digitally manipulated) image color-printed on the CV, which is a common cost-saving
practice used by Austrian job applicants.
3.3. Sending out the applications
While it is not an absolute necessity to send all the different applications to each firm, it
serves the advantage of controlling for firm-specific variables.
15 Besides that it allows to
collect data more quickly.
In principle, the most straightforward experiment to test for discrimination based on
sexual orientation would be to send applications of all four different applicants, the
feminine straight (FS), the masculine straight (MS), the feminine lesbian (FL) and the
masculine lesbian (ML), to the same vacancies and compare the invitation rates.
Evaluating the success rates for an identical woman who one time indicates she is a
lesbian, and the other time does not, would allow to measure the effect of sexual
orientation. At the same time, a comparison of the feminine and masculine female of
one particular sexual orientation could be used to calculate the effect of gender.
However, the actual research setup faces a special problem: two identical applications
of a single individual—one time labeled as lesbian, the other time not—cannot be sent
to the same firm. They would be immediately identified as representing one single
person instead of being evaluated independently. Particularly, the photograph leads to an
instantaneous recognition of the identical applicant. Similarly, it is not possible to send
the applications of the two lesbians to one firm. Employers would certainly detect the
‘‘coincidence’’ of two applicants declaring themselves as lesbians at the same time!
Consequently, we had to choose a more indirect route to gain the desired data. First, we
collected data comparing the two heterosexual women, then we submitted applications
by one heterosexual and one lesbian with differing gender identity to each firm under
investigation. This avoided the problem of detection, but still allowed to control for
firm-specific variables.
The Saturday issue of the Austrian newspaper ‘‘Kurier’’ was examined weekly for
relevant job advertisements, as it provides the largest amount of job announcements from
the biggest Austrian labor market, the Greater Vienna area.
The experiment was conducted in three different steps: from early to late 1998, all the
firms searching for accountants or secretaries were contacted by the two straight women
15 Adam (1981) sent only one re ´sume ´ to each firm, which does not control for firm specific effects, but
allows using completely identical letters of application instead of creating matching ones, since there is no danger
of detection.
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straight and masculine lesbian women were sent to all vacancies (round 2). Finally, from
mid-1999 to early 2000, the feminine lesbian and masculine straight woman applied to all
announced vacancies (round 3). In total, 1226 applications were sent out in response to
613 job openings.
If an entrepreneur was interested in one of the applicants, she could be contacted either
through a Viennese address, or by leaving a message on her answering machine. When one
of the applicants was invited to an interview, the proposed appointment was canceled to
avoid any inconveniences on the firm’s side.
4. Results
4.1. Discrimination against masculine woman
Table 1 shows the invitation rates of the different applicants. Table 1a illustrates the
effect of sexual orientation on the masculine woman. First, the pair of straight females with
different gender identity applied to each relevant job opening. The feminine woman was
invited by 43.38% of all contacted firms, the masculine one by 42.65%, which means that
the feminine female was more successful by 0.74 percentage points. The null hypothesis
that the two women were treated the same could not be rejected. Second, applications of
the feminine straight female and the masculine lesbian were sent out to all firms. The
Table 1






Feminine straight, FS 43.38% Feminine straight, FS 60.82%
Masculine straight, MS 42.65% Masculine lesbian, ML 47.95%
Difference, FSMS 0.74% Difference, FSML 12.87%
Effect of sexual orientation,
difference in differences (MSML)= 12.13%*






Masculine straight, MS 42.65% Masculine straight, MS 48.82%
Feminine straight, FS 43.38% Feminine lesbian, FL 36.47%
Difference, MSFS 0.74% Difference, MSFL 12.35%
Effect of sexual orientation,
difference in differences (FSFL)= 13.09%*
N=number of firms contacted by pair of applicants.
*Significant at the 5% level.
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47.95%.
16 This represents an advantage of the feminine straight female of 12.87
percentage points. Remember that this difference occurs, although both individuals apply
to the same firms, i.e. firm specific effects are controlled for. What is of central interest,
though, is the comparison between the masculine straight and lesbian female, which can
only be obtained via the difference in differences: The advantage of the feminine straight
woman over the masculine woman increases from 0.74 percentage points to 12.87
percentage points, when the latter indicates lesbian orientation. This indicates an
advantage of the straight masculine female over her lesbian counterpart of 12.13
percentage points
17 and means that the probability of the masculine female to be invited
to an interview decreases by 12.13 percentage points when she reveals a lesbian
orientation.
18
4.2. Discrimination against feminine woman
Table 1b demonstrates the effect of sexual orientation on the feminine female. As has
been noted before, the straight feminine female has an advantage over her masculine
counterpart of 0.74 percentage points. In the next step, the masculine straight female and
the feminine lesbian applied for the same jobs. The masculine straight woman was
invited to an interview by 48.82 percentage points of all contacted firms, the feminine
lesbian by 36.47 percentage points. Consequently, the masculine straight woman had an
advantage compared to the feminine lesbian of 12.35 percentage points. Calculating the
difference in differences (DD), we see that the declaration of her sexual preference
decreases the feminine female’s chances to be invited for an interview by 13.09
percentage points.
19
The underlying assumption of the DD experiment is that while the absolute values
of invitation rates for the straight applicants can be different in each stage, e.g. due to
the business-cycle or—as is more likely in our experiment—seasonal changes, the
differences in invitation rates must be invariant over the different stages of the
experiment.
20
16 The high overall rates of invitations in the second round are rather striking and must be due to seasonal
changes. Other exogenous changes of labor demand or other macroeconomic variables are possible but unlikely
within this short time period, since there were no observable changes in the business cycle.
17 Investigating discrimination for the two occupational subcategories separately, we find significant
discrimination against the masculine lesbian only for secretaries. This might be due to the fact that normative
heterosexuality is more of an inherent requirement for secretaries while accountants often work autonomously and
have even less contact with clients and customers.
20 When indicating a lesbian orientation, the invitation rate of the feminine female decreases by a higher
amount (13.09%) than that of the masculine one (12.13%); nevertheless, the difference between the two gender
types is statistically insignificant (13.09–12.13=0.96. The difference of 0.0096 lies within the confidence
interval for a=5%, which is [0.226, 0.245]). This implies both women have an identical disadvantage when
disclosing their sexual preference.
19 Again, this effect is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
18 The negative effect of discrimination is significant at the 5% level using a one-sided test.
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probability of being invited to an interview is estimated with a logit model. The observed
values are 0 and 1, i.e. not invited, invited to an interview. The probability of being invited
to an interview is estimated as a function of gender (femininity versus masculinity) and
sexual orientation. The table presents marginal effects. Since the different rounds took
place sequentially, they are included in the estimation to control for time-effects. No other
controls are necessary since the applicants are matched in all other characteristics than
gender and sexual orientation. While gender does not have an effect on invitation rates
(neither feminine nor masculine women are preferred by employers), sexual orientation
has very much so. As has been seen before, an indicator for lesbian orientation reduces the
probability to be invited to an interview by 13.10 percentage points for the feminine and
12 percentage points for the masculine female. This means indicating a lesbian orientation
when applying for a job triggers unfavorable treatment while one’s personal style
(femininity or masculinity) does not seem to matter.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we examined the impact of lesbian sexual orientation and gender identity
on the chances of getting invited to a job interview. Previous research investigating
discrimination based on sexual orientation has provided ambiguous results for lesbians’
earnings, usually indicating higher incomes for lesbians. However, this advantage for
lesbian workers could be due to a number of different reasons, e.g. selection bias (only
high income lesbians disclose their sexual orientation), insufficient controls for occupa-
tions, or unobserved differences in productive characteristics. Furthermore, since the
available data does not provide information on disclosure on the job, a large number of
investigated individuals might not be ‘‘out’’ on the job and therefore not confronted with
an income loss—although discrimination based on sexual orientation does occur to those
‘‘outed’’ to the public.
Our experiment allowed to collect data free of any of the previously mentioned flaws,
comparing the labor market outcomes for open lesbians and heterosexual women of
Table 2
Invitation to an interview
Logit (marginal effects)
(1) (2)
Masculine gender 0.004 (0.15) 0.007 (0.17)
Lesbian sexual orientation 0.126 (3.39)** 0.131 (2.00)*
Masculine lesbian 0.011 (0.10)
Round 2 0.177 (4.56)** 0.175 (3.62)**
Round 3 0.059 (1.49) 0.062 (1.27)
Observations 1226 1226
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 5%.
**Significant at 1%.
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increased masculinity is responsible for lesbians’ higher earnings as suggested by
Blandford (2003) and Clain and Leppel (2001).
We find that indicating a lesbian identity reduces one’s invitation rate by about 12–13
percentage points, which corresponds with Adam’s (1981) results, who finds a 11
percentage points reduction of invitation rates for females in the city of Toronto. Since
the experimental setup controlled for productivity, it has to be discrimination which is
responsible for this unfavorable treatment of lesbians. Customers’ discrimination is an
unlikely source for differential treatment since the investigated jobs do not require much
customer contact. However, coworkers’ discrimination as well as employer’s discrimina-
tion can be responsible for this outcome. While the bosses of most positions we applied to
probably were male, the jobs under investigation were clearly female-dominated and
suggest predominantly female coworkers. However, Kite and Whitley (1996) showed in
their meta-study that—although men hold more negative attitudes toward gay men—men
and women do not significantly differ in their negative attitudes toward lesbians.
Consequently, both groups—employers and coworkers—are equally likely to cause
differential treatment.
The hypothesis that gender identity might have a separate influence on labor market
outcomes could not be verified. This means, at least with respect to being invited to an
interview, that increased masculinity neither works as an advantage nor as a disadvan-
tage—neither for straight nor lesbian women.
Although wage regressions indicate higher earnings for lesbian women, the results of
this study demonstrate that lesbians are, in fact, not a relatively privileged group, but—
much to the contrary—are subject to discrimination. Their higher incomes may be due to
measurement errors or increased productivity. This productivity might be driven by
higher effort and on-the-job-training and is possible, since lesbians do carry less
household responsibility, but also necessary, because they cannot receive transfers from
a partner.
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